
















Taxation, Marriage and Labor Supply: Evidence from a Natural 
























Buffeteau: École Nationale de la Statistique et de l’Administration Économique, 3, avenue Pierre Larousse, 92245 
Malakoff Cedex 
Échevin: Direction de la Prévision – Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie – Télédoc 673, 139 
rue de Bercy, 75572 Paris Cedex 12 
damien.echevin@dp.finances.gouv.fr 
 
We thank G. Belet, E. Bretin, O. Donni, B. Fortin, M. Gurgand, J.-M. Hourriez, G. Lacroix, H. Lamotte, P. 
Merrigan, N. Moreau and B. Saint-Aubin for useful comments. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of 
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the institutions they represent. Abstract:  This paper uses the French family quotient (“quotient familial”) reform of 
1995 to analyse the impact of the individual income tax on marriage behavior and 
labor supply decisions. An important feature of this reform was the cancellation of 
fiscal subsidies aimed at cohabitant couples with children. Before 1995, the system of 
the family quotient granted one extra half unit to each single parent with children as 
defined for tax purposes. The 1995 family quotient reform cancels the benefit for 
cohabitants with children by introducing the notion of isolated parents with children in 
the tax declaration. This measure thus compensates the marriage penalty for couples 
with children but does not change anything for couples without children. As a result, 
the tax for a one-earner cohabitant couple with one child that earns 35,000 euros a 
year has increased by about 1,200 euros after the reform. To assess the impact of 
the reform, we use the difference-in-differences estimation approach. Using the panel 
structure of the French employment survey (1990-2000) we find that the probability of 
marriage has increased for stable couples by about 4 points because of the reform. 
In a second stage, the response of married women with children is analyzed, using 
as a control group women who did not have children before they married. We 
therefore identify the tax effect as the difference between the change in the labor 
supply of women with children before they married and the change in the labor 
supply of women without children before they married. We find strong evidence that 
the labor supply of married women has decreased due to the 1995 family quotient 
reform. Nevertheless, although our results support the working hours response, they 
are inconclusive as to participation response. 
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11 Introduction
An important issue concerning the structure of the tax system is whether progressive
marginal tax rates induce responsiveness in terms of individual behaviors. There is a
large literature on the impact of the individual income tax on labor supply decisions (see
Fortin and Lacroix, 2002, for a recent survey). But less work has been carried out con-
cerning the impact of the individual income tax on marriage behavior. To our knowledge,
no empirical study has tried to analyse the responsiveness in terms of both marriage and
labor supply taken simultaneously. The reason is that existing theoretical models are not
easily adaptable, since they concentrate either on the link between taxation and labor sup-
ply or on the link between taxation and marriage. Hence, no sound theoretical model has
fully managed to establish the simultaneity of these links so far.
If we consider the income tax, the combination of progressive tax rates with a struc-
ture in which families with identical total income and family structure pay equal taxes
(regardless of whether the income is earned by one worker or two) inevitably generates
non-neutrality regarding marriage. This is the case for the USA where the federal income
tax system has a progressive marginal tax rate structure with features that vary accord-
ing to legal marital status. Of course, there are countless possibilities for tax penalties or
subsidies, depending upon the level and the division of income among individuals. For
example, in the USA case, the “marriage penalties” or “marriage beneﬁts” range from
about −4% of earnings for a one-earner couple to +3% for a two-earners couple (see Ta-
ble 1 in Alm and al., 1999). This is also the case for France, though marriage penalties
are very rare compared to marriage subsidies.
According to standard economic theory, marriage penalties may affect the probability
of marriage and the timing of the marriage decision (Becker, 1991, Alm and Whitting-
ton, 1996, 1999). Marriage penalties and subsidies may also affect labor supply decisions
for married individuals. For example, consider an individual who is not currently work-
ing (the “secondary earner” of the family) and whose spouse is working (the “primary
earner”). If the secondary earner decides to work, then the additional income is taxed at
the marginal tax rate faced by the family on their combined income, and this tax rate is
likely to be much higher than the tax rate that the individual would face if single. On the
other hand, marriage penalties or subsidies may affect labor supply in a non-direct way.
Indeed, the variations in marriage penalties could affect the “reservation welfare” a spouse
may be able to achieve if she/he were not married. As a consequence, marriage subsidies
entailed by the difference in earnings between the two earners could move the “sharing
rule” between the spouses to the advantage of the secondary earner. Though there ex-
ists an important theoretical literature on this effect (Chiappori, 1988, 1992, Chiappori
and al., 2002, Donni, 2003, Moreau and Donni, 2002), there is little empirical evidence
for the kind of “sharing rule” effect encapsulated by collective labor supply approaches,
particularly in the case of taxation (exceptions are Laisney, 2002, Bargain and Moreau,
2002).
In this paper, we concentrate on the impact of the taxation on the marriage of cohab-
itant couples and on the labor supply of married women. We try to take into account
the selectivity bias due to marriage selection in the study of the labor supply of married
women. This kind of bias is often overlooked in labor supply studies.
Of course, economists do not have the full story about the decision to marry or not.
2All they can do is to put some lights on the part of people’s behavior that is meaningful
for economists.
Changing social norms are good candidates to explain the evolution of the marriage
rate as well. For instance, a good indicator of the weight of the social pressure to marry
is certainly the annual rate of children born out of marriage (see Figure 1). In France, it
appears that this rate is quite stable -from 10% to 6%- during the two thirds of the century
with pics during the two wars. At the end of the 60’s (probably around 1968), the annual
rate of children born out of marriage begins to raise and attains more than 40% at the
end of the century. Thus, though in the major part of the 20th century, being married to
have children seems to be a norm, nay an obligation, it is no more the case at the end
of the century: the high number of children that are born out of marriage attests that the
relationship between fecundity and marriage tends to crumble away. To be born out of
marriage does not even signify that children are born out of a couple.
Since nowadays social pressure to marry, even in presence of children in the couple,
is probably not so strong, our intuition is that a tax reform that treats differently cohabi-
tant couples with children and cohabitant couples without children before marriage could
prove to be a valuable “natural experiment” in order to evaluate the impact of taxation and
ﬁnancial incitatives on both marriage and labor supply.
Our empirical strategy thus consists in using the French family quotient (“quotient
familial”) reform of 1995 as a natural experiment. An important feature of this reform
was the cancellation of ﬁscal subsidies aimed at cohabitant couples with children. The
fundamental assumption of this natural experiment approach is that both the control (i.e.
cohabitant couples without children) and the treatment (i.e. cohabitant couples with chil-
dren) groups are similarly affected by factors not considered explicitly in the analysis.
One of the advantages of this approach is to get round the problems emerging from
having no structural model to establish the simultaneity of the links between taxation,
marriage and labor supply. Under plausible assumptions, the natural experiment approach
allows one to estimate some structural parameters of the labor supply function. However,
this approach is not well suited to infer potential impact of policy changes other than those
considered in any particular analysis.
Therefore, our approach is quite different from more structural ones that often con-
sider the demographic parameters as given and thus neglect the fact that the decision to
marry can depend on tax schedules. One recent example of the structural approach is the
Laroque and Salani´ e (2002)’s model that simulates the impact on employment of several
reforms of the French taxation and social system. In particular, changing social or ﬁscal
conditions for women -depending on the number of children for instance- have been iden-
tiﬁed as a major source of women’s under-participation to the labor market in France. For
that reason, our empirical investigation takes explicitly into account one important social
program concerning employment : the APE (Allocation Parentale d’Education) program.
This program was created in 1985 to allow one spouse of a family with three children with
at least one child under 3 years old to stop working or reduce his/her activity. In 1994,
the APE was extended to families with two children with one less than 3 years old. This
reform has had important effects on the employment of women: these effects are well
documented (see for example Piketty, 1998).
On the other hand, in a country where taxation is familialized, the selection bias due
to marriage should be an important issue. Indeed, it could have important effects on
3the previous evaluations. In particular, the reforms could have increased or decreased
the marriage rate of more productive women, the ones who do not necessarily have prior
preferencesformarriage. Hence, theimpactoftaxationonlaborsupplyofmarriedwomen
could have been over-evaluated or under-evaluated because of the speciﬁcities of the tax
system.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main features of the 1995
family quotient reform and provides a description of the data used in the empirical analy-
sis. Section 3 shows how the labor supply model can be made equivalent to DD estimator
and discusses the empirical variables used in the model. Main ﬁndings are reported in
Section 4. Finally, the paper points up conclusions in Section 5.
2 Data
The data used in the analysis are drawn from the French employment survey and collected
by the INSEE across the years 1990 to 2000. Prior to discussing the survey and its main
features, we ﬁrst describe the tax system in France and the 1995 reform.
2.1 The tax system in France and the family quotient reform of 1995
The French tax system is “familialized”. The family quotient principle is as follows: the
income is considered per ﬁscal unit (the reference person and his/her spouse count for one
unit each, the ﬁrst and the second persons in charge count for one half-unit each, and the
third and followings ones count for one unit each) and the marginal tax rate is determined
for each ﬁscal unit with this family quotient. Other particularities of the ﬁscal unit can be
taken into account to calculate the family quotient : handicap, widowhood, etc..
The reform of 1995 has changed the deﬁnition of the family quotient. Before 1995,
the system of the family quotient granted one extra half unit to each single parent with
children as deﬁned for tax purposes. The 1995 family quotient reform cancels this beneﬁt
for cohabitants with children by introducing the notion of isolated parents with children
in the tax declaration (Table 1). This measure thus makes up the marriage penalty for
couples with children but does not change anything for couples without children. Further-
more, marriage penalties decrease less for cohabitants with children that have a low wage
differential than for those with a high wage differential (Table 2). For example, before
the reform, a two-earners couple with identical earnings (of 17,500 euros each) and one
child has a marriage penalty of about −397 euros. After the reform, the marriage penal-
ties canceled. In the subsequent sections, these main characteristics of the 1995 family
quotient reform are used to identify the responsiveness to the reform in terms of marriage
and labor supply.
2.2 The sample
The sample is issued from the French employment survey 1990-2000. Approximately
70,000 households are surveyed each year and over three consecutive years. Information
on matrimonial status, age, education, participation in the labor market, working hours
per week, and earnings are available. For our analysis, we rule out households whose
head is over 60 years old, student or self-employed.
42.3 Main evolutions during the 90’s
Using the data for the years 1990 to 2000, on average, the ratio of minimum wage to
maximumwageinthehouseholdisdecreasing. Itamountsto80%formarriedcouplesand
83% for cohabitant couples (Figure 2). The gap between married couples and cohabitant
couples is still signiﬁcant when differentiating by age (Figure 3).
Another way of regarding the same phenomenon is to compare the marriage rates
for various conﬁgurations of earnings within the couple (Figure 4). By grouping the
couples into different categories, we notice that marriage rates are higher for couples
whose earnings are particularly dissimilar. Hence, that could reﬂect the impact of taxation
on marriage, since couples with low tax incentives seem to marry less.
The inequality gap within the couple between married couples on the one hand and
cohabitants couples on the other hand can be interpreted either as a cause or as a conse-
quence of marriage.
It can be regarded as a cause of marriage in the following cases:
- spouse selection: women tend to choose productive spouses so that the earnings of
married men are higher than the earnings of unmarried men;
- matching: depending on individual preferences (positive or negative complemen-
tarities), the difference in earnings can be an explicative factor for couple formation, its
stability and, by extension, for marriage;
- assurance: marriage can be seen as an assurance for the spouse that earns less;
- taxation: marriage subsidies are high when difference in earnings is big.
It can be regarded as a consequence of marriage in the following cases:
- division of labor within the household;
- marriage may be valued in the professional environment: with imperfect informa-
tion, marriage can be seen by the employer as a sign of efﬁciency.
Because of these difﬁculties to identify the impact of marriage on earnings, our study
concentrates on a sample of stable couples (i.e. together over three consecutive years),
who had originally been cohabitants, and possibly cohabitant or married couples in sub-
sequent years. The sample is ﬁnally composed of 7,850 couples interviewed each year
over three years during the period 1990-2000 (see Table 5).
2.4 Preliminary evidence on the impact of the 1995 reform
As proposed previously the family quotient reform of 1995 is considered as a natural ex-
periment: one then compares the difference in behaviors (marriage and labor supply) after
and before the reform for groups affected by it (cohabitant couples with children) to this
difference for unaffected groups (cohabitant couples without children). The difference-in-
differences (DD) estimator (further discussed in the next section) results from this com-
parison. Figures 5-9 report preliminary results from simple comparisons using our sample
of 7,850 couples.
Figure 5 clearly shows that the gap between the marriage rate of cohabitant couples
with children, that are concerned by the reform, and the marriage rate of cohabitant cou-
ples without children has signiﬁcantly risen after the 1995 reform. Indeed, before 1995,
the marriage rate of about 15.5% is not signiﬁcantly different for both couples with chil-
dren and couples without children. After the reform, the marriage rate is 13.1% for cou-
5ples without children and 15.7% for couples with children: this difference is statistically
signiﬁcant at less than 5%.
Figure 6 shows the simple DD estimator by quintile of earnings. It is higher for low
earnings’ households. As shown in ﬁgure 7, this result could reﬂect the fact that difference
in earnings is higher in low earnings’ percentiles, so that the simple DD estimator for
marriage is higher for couples with a great difference in earnings, as shown in ﬁgure 8.
Figure 9 shows the working hours for married women with or without children before
they married. It seems that a simple DD estimator approach does not provide a clear
result of what happens concerning the labor supply of married women. Indeed, although
the amount of working hours decreases sharply the year after the reform, this effect could
only be temporary.
In the next section, we propose an estimation strategy that enables us to estimate the
impact of the reform on marriage and labor supply by taking into account other structural
effects. In particular, our empirical approach tries to take into account the selectivity bias
due to marriage selection in the study of the labor supply of married women. This way, we
show that the reform has increased the marriage rate of more productive women, the ones
who do not necessarily have prior preferences for marriage. That could explain why the
simple DD estimator is only slightly signiﬁcant for the working hours of married women
at work.
3 The statistical model
3.1 Difference-in-differences estimator
DD estimates of the impact of the 1995 reform on labor supply and standard errors for
these estimates are derived from using Ordinary Least Squares on individuals in treatment
and control groups for several years before and after the reform.
Formally, the population of cohabitant couples is divided into two groups: Group C
(control group) includes couples without children before they choose to marry or not and
Group T (treatment group) includes those with children before they choose to marry or
not. The working hours for a married woman i at t is assumed to be as follows:
hi(t) = α + αT1iT + αR1R + αTR1iT1R + zi(t)β + 1iTzi(t)βT + hi(t), (1)
In this equation, 1iT is a dummy variable equal to one when the woman belongs to
the treatment group, 1R is a dummy variable for the post-reform period. The parameters
α and αT measure the control group and treatment group invariant speciﬁc effects. The
parameter αR allows for a post-reform shift in the working hours that is common to both
treatment and control groups. Furthermore, the impact of the reform on the working hours
of the treatment group, which is given by αTR, is provided by the parameter associated
with the interaction term between the post-reform and the treatment group dummy vari-
ables, 1iT1R. We thus suppose that the reform has no effect on the control group. This
parameter can be interpreted as a change in the post-reform working hours of the treat-
ment groups -and controlling for the explanatory variables included in the vector zi(t).
Since the women with children before marriage group can differ in terms of age or edu-
cation to the control group, zi(t) includes age and its square, and education and its square
6as covariates. The education variable is the number of completed years of schooling. The
parameters β and βT allow for speciﬁc effects of the independent variable on the control
and treatment groups. Other factors not considered in the analysis are supposed to affect
both groups similarly. The hi(t)’s are i.i.d. random variables with zero mean reﬂecting
individual unobserved heterogeneity.
3.2 Selection
The labor supply function for married women at work is estimated by ﬁrst excluding
unemployed and unmarried women from the sample and then adjusting the estimation
method to avoid sample selection bias. Separate selection rules are estimated for both
employment and marriage.
Indeed, as argued by Poirier (1980) and Ham (1982), combining two selection rules
into one would produce inconsistent parameter estimates. Therefore, since the marriage
decision and the participation in the labor market decision may be correlated, we use
the extension of Heckman’s approach proposed by Ham (1982) to the case where two
correlated selection rules generate the sample.
Consider the general model of hours determination proposed in the preceding subsec-
tion. Assume that women experience employment if
ei(t) = xei(t)βe + ei(t) > 0, (2)
while women experience marriage if
mi(t) = xmi(t)βm + mi(t) > 0, (3)
In equations (2) and (3), βe and βm are vectors of parameters, and ei(t) and mi(t)
are error terms. The vectors xei(t) and xmi(t) include independent variables like age or
schooling, as well as post-reform and treatment dummies and their interactions. Further-
more, in the French tax system, marriage subsidies are increasing with the differences in
spouses’ earnings. This variable is thus introduced in the marriage equation and is com-
puted as the ratio of minimum to maximum earnings within cohabitant couples, it is equal
to zero for a one earner couple.
Then, theexpectationofhi(t)conditionalonei(t) > 0andmi(t) > 0canbeexpressed
as
E(hi(t)|ei(t) > 0,mi(t) > 0) = α + αT1iT + αR1R + αTR1iT1R
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7and φ(·) and Φ(·) are the univariate normal density and distribution functions respectively.
F(·) is the bivariate standard normal distribution function, σk is the standard deviation of
k (with k = e,m), and ρ is the correlation between these error terms.
Based on standard economic theory, one should expect labor supply to decline with
an increase in marriage beneﬁts. Therefore, the parameter αTR in equation (1) should be
negative. According to Becker (1991), one should also expect the marriage rate to rise
with an increase in the marriage subsidies. Thus, since the reform could have increased
the marriage rate of more productive women -that is the ones who do not necessarily have
prior preferences for marriage- least squares estimation of (1) on the censored sample
will lead to speciﬁcation error biases. Then least squares estimation of (4) can be used to
obtain consistent estimates of αTR.
In the next section we will present results for marriage and labor supply of married
women.
4 Results
In this section, we present natural experiment estimates of the impact of the French family
quotient reform of 1995 on marriage and labor supply of married women.
Our empirical strategy ﬁrst aims at evaluating the impact of the reform on marriage
and employment. Secondly, we focus on the impact of the reform on the working hours of
married women at work. We thus estimate the parameters of the selection rule equations
by bivariate probit analysis and then use these parameters to form consistent estimates of
Mills ratios in equation (4). Then least squares can be used to obtain consistent estimates
of the impact of the reform on labor supply.
4.1 The impact of the 1995 reform on women’s marriage and em-
ployment
Table 3 presents bivariate probit estimates of the impact of the reform on marriage and
employment. Our ﬁndings are as follows:
1. Model 1 reports simple DD estimates without structural effects. We ﬁnd that having
a child before marriage has a negative and signiﬁcant effect on employment and the
impact of the reform on employment is not signiﬁcant. The reform has a positive
and signiﬁcant impact on marriage.
2. Model 2 presents results obtained from a reduced sample that rules out couples
who are eligible to the APE (Allocation Parentale d’Education) program. In 1994,
the APE program was extended to families with two children with one less than
3 years old. To control for the important effect of the APE program on women’s
employment, 672 out of 7037 couples are thus ruled out of the sample, the ones who
meet the new conditions to enter the APE program. The estimation results are quite
the same: indeed, the impact of the reform on employment decreases toward zero
and is still non signiﬁcant; the impact on marriage is still positive and signiﬁcant.
83. Model3addsexplanatoryvariablestotheanalysis. Ageandeducationhavepositive
and signiﬁcant effects on employment. As expected, difference in spouses’ earnings
has a positive though non signiﬁcative impact on marriage. Moreover, introducing
covariates in the analysis does not change the result for the post-reform employment
shift that is still non signiﬁcant. The impact on marriage is not changed either: the
marginal effect of the reform on marriage is +0.044 (see table 3b).
4. Univariate probit estimates are reported in the last two columns of Table 3. No im-
portant differences are recorded between univariate and bivariate estimates. Indeed,
though the estimated correlation between the error terms is signiﬁcant, it is small
(-0.1).
Table 3b sums up the estimation results.
Table 3b: Marginal effects of independent variables on marriage behavior and married
women’s employment (Bivariate Probit - Model 3)
Variable X Mean of X dE[M|E=1]/dX dE[E|M=1]/dX
Post 95 .4909 -.0374 n.s.
Child before marriage .4741 n.s. -.6113
Post 95 x Child before marriage .2480 .0444 n.s.
Ratio of min. to max. earnings .4444 n.s. -
Child before marriage x ratio .1943 1.0598 -
Age 33.66 n.s. .0444
Education 18.71 n.s. .0566
4.2 The impact of the 1995 reform on working hours
Since the marriage decision and the participation to the labor market decision are corre-
lated, we use the extension of Heckman’s approach proposed by Ham (1982) to the case
where two correlated selection rules generate the sample.
Table 4 presents least squares estimates concerning the impact of the reform on work-
ing hours of married women at work. Our ﬁndings are as follows:
1. Model 1 shows non signiﬁcant impact of the reform on labor supply when no struc-
tural effects nor selection biases are taken into account.
2. Model 2 takes into account APE program effects by dropping 43 out of 714 couples,
but the impact of the reform is still non signiﬁcant.
3. Adding covariates in Model 3 does not change the former results.
4. Taking into account selectivity biases in Model 4 by adding Mills ratios for em-
ployment and marriage sharply changes the conclusions. Having children before
marriage seems to increase the amount of working hours when married women de-
cide to work. Age has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on working hours, though this
effect is reduced, nay negative, in presence of children. Education has a negative
and signiﬁcant impact on working hours in presence of children. Indeed, in French
9surveys 2/3 of women choosing part time jobs declare not to be constraint, and they
probably are the more educated women.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd evidence that the amount of working hours of married women
has decreased by about 3 hours per week because of the reform. Because of the
importance of this effect, we can conclude that overlooking the “marriage bias” in
labor supply studies can induce serious evaluation errors. This is especially the case
in countries where tax and beneﬁts are familialized like in France or in the USA.
5. Correcting for heteroscedasticity in Model 5 doesn’t change the preceding conclu-
sions.
Table 4b sums up the estimation results.
Table 4b: Effects of independent variables on working hours of married women at work
Variable X Mean of X dH/dX
Post 95 .4739 2.4269 (1.2424)
Child before marriage .4754 23.6068 (8.4512)
Post 95 x Child before marriage .2578 -2.8742 (1.7578)
Age 33.81 .1033 (.0559)
Education 19.18 -.1198 (.2228)
Mills ratio for employment .4909 -9.3468 (5.6719)
Mills ratio for marriage 1.5720 -23.6362 (8.9589)
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
F-test is signiﬁcative at 1.7% level.
5 Conclusion
This paper uses the French family quotient reform of 1995 to analyse the impact of taxes
on marriage and labor supply. This reform cancels the beneﬁt for cohabitants with chil-
drenbyintroducingthenotionofisolatedparentswithchildreninthetaxdeclaration. This
measure thus offsets the marriage penalty for couples with children but does not change
anything for couples without children.
Using the panel structure of the French employment survey (1990-2000) we ﬁnd that
the probability of marriage has increased for stable couples (i.e. together over three con-
secutive years) who had originally been cohabitants, by about 4 points because of the
reform. Furthermore, we ﬁnd strong evidence that the labor supply of married women has
decreased due to the 1995 family quotient reform: in the selected sample, the working
hours of married women at work have decreased by about 3 hours per week. Neverthe-
less, although our ﬁndings support the working hours response, they are inconclusive as
to participation response.
Our conclusions are then as follows:
1. Our natural experiment approach succeeds in showing the impact of the 1995 tax
reform on both marriage and labor supply considered simultaneously. However,
from a theoretical point of view, the interpretation of these effects is twofold.
10The impact of individual income tax on marriage behavior and labor supply de-
cisions could be interpreted on the one hand as a non conventional one since the
variations of the family quotient only affect the “reservation welfare” a spouse may
be able to achieve if she/he were not married. Then, using up-to-date and quite
novel micro-economic analyses of labor supply, our results provide empirical evi-
dence for the kind of “sharing rule” effect encapsulated by collective labor supply
approaches. On the other hand, our results are coherent with the univariate model as
well since the reform has simply increased the cost of a divorce for married couples
and thus decreased uncertainty concerning the future. Further researches should
thus resolve this point.
Whatever the theory behind the empirical results, our analysis points out the difﬁ-
culties due to marriage selection in the study of the labor supply of married women.
This kind of bias is often overlooked in labor supply studies and thus could have in-
duce evaluation errors, especially in countries where taxation is familialized like in
France or in the USA. Further empirical studies should thus be conducted in these
countries.
2. From a more practical point of view, this work leads us to conclude that tax policy
can inﬂuence decisions within households through measures targeted at speciﬁc
groups of people -married or cohabitants couples. In particular, a familialized tax
system appears to be non neutral in terms of women’s employment, as the actual
social system does (through the APE for instance). Given the important policy
implications of these ﬁndings, particular attention should thus be given to the sound
structuring of both ﬁscal and social programs.
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14Table 2: Marriage subsidies before and after the 1995 reform for a couple that earns
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23Table 3: Estimating the probability of being employed or married
Variable Employment Marriage Employment Marriage Employment Marriage Employment Marriage
Constant
.7107        
(.0323)**
-1.0040     
(.0489)**
.7176       
(.0324)**
-1.0137     
(.0494)**
-3.5822     
(.4815)**
.1722        
(.8629)
-3.5658      
(.5591)**
.1021        
(.8198)
Post 95
.0461      
(.0478)
-.1219      
(.0532)**
.0508        
(.0481)
-.1277       
(.0537)**
-.0023      
(.0491)
-.1661      
(.0891)*
-.0027     
(.0492)





-.0393      
(.0658)
-.2819      
(.0471)**
-.0182      
(.0693)
-1.7287      
(.7213)**
-.7701      
(1.2637)
-1.7386     
(.8223)**
-.8503     
(1.1762)
Post 95 x children before marriage
-.4712       
(.6398)
.1609       
(.0730)**
.0409       
(.0677)
.1554       
(.0768)**
-.0143      
(.0699)
.1972       
(.1223)*
-.0144      
(.0699)
.2000       
(.1205)*
Ratio of min. to max. earnings -
.0472        
(.0728)
-
.0497       
(.0738)
-
-2.8408     
(1.9896)
-
-2.8524     
(1.7585)
Child before marriage x ratio -
.0127        
(.0965)
-
.0086        
(.1016)
-
4.7055     
(2.6876)*
-
4.8792     
(2.4484)**
Controls
Schooling, Age YES YES
Sch., Age x Child bef. marriage YES YES
Sch., Age x Child b. marr. x ratio - NO - NO - YES - YES
Rho --
Log-Likelihood -3489.228      -2714.446     
Sample size 6365 6365
Notes:
(a) Standard errors are in parenthesis.
(b) Dependent variable coded 1 if employed, 0 otherwise.
(c) Dependent variable coded 1 if married, 0 otherwise.
(d) **Significant at 5% level *Significant at 10% level.
7037 6365 6365
-6197.488      -6398.770      -7241.857     
Univariate probit estimates Bivariate probit estimates
-.0919 (.0256)**
NO
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25Table 5: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Age (women) 33.6 8.2
Age (men) 35.7 8.3
Years of schooling (women) 18.5 3.3
Years of schooling (men) 18.0 3.5
Children before marriage .526 .499
Married after one year .150 .358
Employment rate (women) .662 .473
Employment rate (men) .844 .363
Monthly earnings (women)* 1,027 782
Monthly earnings (men)* 1,313 1,762
Ratio of min. to max. earnings within the couple .809 .232
Total monthly earnings 1,774 1,939
*Employed persons only. In euros.
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